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ABSTRACT: 
The paper investigates how high levels of political risk in a host market’s institutional context 
influences MNE subsidiaries’ corporate political activity (CPA) strategy. Existing studies have found 
that subsidiaries facing high-risk contexts prefer a non-engaged approach to CPA, by exercising ‘no 
exit’ and ‘no voice’ strategies. Based on interviews with business leaders in post-socialist Hungary – a 
context characterised by high political risk – we present contradictory evidence. We find that 
subsidiaries – do not limit their strategic responses to non-engagement but use a variety of different 
engaged and non-engaged strategies to maintain their position in the high-risk host market, but these 
strategies differ from the traditional ‘voice’ strategies used in low-risk contexts. The paper identifies 
five different strategic choices: 1. Active responsiveness, 2. Passive responsiveness, 3. A non-
responsive strategy of ‘dormancy’, 4. Restructuring to avoid being ‘bought up’ or pushed out of the 
market and 5. Exit, when firms leave the country. We theorise about the determinants of non-market 
strategic choices in high-risk environments and suggest that existing theories need to be expanded by 
applying an institutional legitimacy perspective to political risk. 
KEYWORDS: Business-government relationships; Political strategies; Non-market strategies; 
Political risk, corporate political activities (CPA) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Political risk is a widely investigated phenomenon in international business research, since 
government actions may have a negative impact on firm performance (Boddewyn, 2005). Indeed, 
political risk has been defined as the host government’s interference with MNEs’ foreign operations 
(Han et al 2018: 124), especially in the context of foreign direct investment (FDI). Political risks are 
the key determinant of FDI decisions (Spar, 2001) and yet there is a lack of empirical research about 
the role environmental and intra-firm pressures in firms’ behaviour in politically risky contexts (John 
and Lawton, 2018).  
While the management literature explores how firms estimate and manage risks, studies on 
corporate political activity (CPA) investigate strategies and tactics that facilitate political risk 
assessment and control for performance implications (John and Lawton, 2018; Lawton et al., 2013). 
The institutional literature on political risk and FDI decisions limit their focus on firms’ market entry 
decisions (Delios and Henisz, 2003) and on their exit strategies, but ignore how firms manage 
political uncertainty when already in the market (John and Lawton, 2018).  
Existing studies that explore how multinational firms react to high political risk identify three 
key strategies that firms use to manage host country’s political risk: exit, organisational restructuring 
or non-engagement. Some studies conclude that when faced with high political risk, MNE subsidiaries 
either exit or do not even enter the host market (Meyer et al., 2009). Others claim that subsidiaries will 
chose and deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA (De Villa et al., 2018) whereby they exercise 
loyalty to the host market by staying or entering but will not actively engage in political strategies. A 
third approach claims that firms will aim to buffer the impact of high political risk, for instance the 
impact of informal political ties, by rearranging their organisational structure in order to segregate, 
isolate, hide and cut off political ties (Dieleman and Boddewyn 2012). Hence the extant literature 
seems to suggest that when faced with high political risk, especially in an emerging market context, 
subsidiaries will either chose not to engage with the host country’s government or they will take a 
reactive stance and focus their strategies on limiting the damage that the high-risk environment might 
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cause.  Yet, our empirical study found that when faced with increased political risk, firms chose 
different strategies, some opt for engagement, while others for non-engagement. Hence the puzzle 
arises, what explains the discrepancy in our empirical findings? How can we explain that in some 
high-risk context firms opt for non-engagement, while in other, companies chose both engaged and 
non-engaged strategies in their political activities? Can we explain the different approaches with 
differences in the host country’s institutional environment or are differences linked to other factors, 
such as political legitimacy or the nature of risk? What are the institutional determinants of 
engagement and non-engagement in international business? Existing literature has focused on how 
subsidiaries mitigate or avoid risk, but not on how firms manage or engage political risk once they are 
in a market and decide to stay in a specific host country environment (Lu at al., 2014). The question 
of what political strategies allow subsidiaries to remain or succeed in politically risky countries has 
not been fully answered (John and Lawton, 2018). We address earlier calls to focus on the 
combination of CPA choices and non-engaged political strategies in different locations and across 
time (De Villa et al., 2018).  
The type of strategy that is effective may depend not only on firm-level factors, but also on 
the precise nature of political risk - which in turn is determined by institutional factors. Risk in a host 
country depends on the country’s stage of institutional and economic development (Han et al., 2018). 
Hence MNEs in well-established socio-economic systems might face non-violent political risks, such 
as unfavourable legislation or stringent entry requirements (Bremmer, 2014), whereas in less 
established capitalist systems they might face more severe risks such as expropriations, the 
overthrown of political regimes or wars (Getz and Oetzel, 2009).  
Previous studies explored how firms leverage their experience with political risk across 
borders (Oh and Oetzel, 2017), how multinationals respond to major disasters at the subsidiary level 
(Oh and Oetzel, 2011) and how managers of multinational enterprises manage risk in fragile and/or 
conflict-affected areas of operation (Oetzel and Miklian, 2017).  
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In order to understand the impact of risk, we need to clarify the nature of political risk. Some 
risks are continuous – such as corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) – and hence predictable for firms, 
while others such as natural or political disasters are “discontinuous” and hence unpredictable (Oetzel 
and Oh, 2014). Discontinuous political risk is difficult to assess, especially in countries in which 
institutional arrangements “fall short of providing adequate and predictable support for business 
transactions and instead allow governments to exercise volatile control over regulation, resources, 
information and the license to operate” (Darendeli and Hill, 2016: 70). In host contexts where political 
risk is continuous, firms may decide to choose a different political strategy than in environments, 
where risk is discontinuous, and the host country context is more uncertain. Hence, in our definition 
of discontinuous risk, we do not refer to vis-majors such as natural disasters or wars, but rather to a 
situation when political and economic changes introduced by the government create high levels of 
uncertainty and unpredictability for firms.  
We know very little about how MNE subsidiaries manage their CPA in host country contexts, 
where the political context changes and turns from a low-risk to a high-risk environment within a few 
years. This question is especially pressing in today’s global economy, when firms face high, 
discontinuous-type political risk in many well-established market economies, such as Brexit in the 
UK, Trump’s industrial policy in the US or Orbán’s illiberal state in the EU member state Hungary.  
We argue that in order to explore how MNEs manage high political risk or the impact of 
increasing political risk for FDI we need to consider applying an institutional legitimacy perspective 
to political risk.  We will investigate how FDI is affected by high political risk or discontinuous risk 
and address earlier calls for research to challenge the assumption that service industries are largely 
immune from political risk (Stevens et al., 2016). This is a critical issue, as service firms now 
undertake more than 60 percent of all FDI worldwide (Kolstad and Villanger, 2008). We address 
Stevens and colleagues’ (2016) call to explore how subsidiaries manage their CPA through the action 
of legitimacy building.  
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We focus on Hungary, where political risk has drastically increased for foreign MNEs in the 
last eight years and for some industries the country turned from a low political risk environment into a 
high-risk context. Existing studies on MNEs’ cross-border CPA choices focus their empirical 
investigation on African (De Villa et al., 2018) or South-East Asian countries (Meznar and Nigh, 
1995), but the impact of political risk on MNE subsidiary’s CPA choices has been underexplored 
within the European Union context, in countries where political risk has increased with the change of 
political context.  
This paper aims to fill this gap by investigating how MNE subsidiaries engage in CPA in the 
increasingly high-risk political context of Hungary. Hungary has recently been referred to as taking a 
U-turn politically (Kornai, 2012) and ‘backsliding’ economically (Greskovits, 2015). It is often 
referred to as an ‘elected autocracy’ (Agh, 2015) or ‘authoritarian capitalism’ (Sallai and Schnyder, 
2018). As such Hungary provides an interesting high-risk host country context within the European 
Union, in which the behaviour of MNE subsidiaries can be investigated.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next section reviews the relevance of political 
legitimacy on FDI, the impact of political risk on firms’ CPA engagement, and then explores how 
firms manage political risk by engaging in corporate political activity (CPA). After presenting the 
methods, we present the empirical evidence from interviews with top-level managers in Hungary. A 
final section concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1. Political legitimacy and FDI 
The impact of political risk on international business (IB) firms is generally explored through two 
different theoretical lenses: the Bargaining Power Approach (BPA), and the Legitimacy Based 
Approach (LBA). BPA explores the relationship between firms and the state from the perspective of 
the balance of bargaining power. According to this approach firm-host organisation bargaining is an 
ongoing resource interdependence relationship, whose outcomes depend on resources the two parties 
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have or would like to have from each other (Brewer, 1992). Firms’ bargaining power in the host 
country decreases over time as initial investment sinks in and the subsidiary’s technological and 
managerial advantages erode vis-à-vis local firms (Stevens et al., 2016). MNEs’ stronger 
organizational capabilities, management skills, and strategies give them a competitive advantage over 
local firms in the early stages of entering new markets (Jiang et al., 2015; Mutlu et al., 2015). 
However, these advantages may erode over time, because local rivals close the gap on MNEs both in 
technology and management knowledge through mutual learning processes (Mutlu et al., 2015). As 
MNEs power in bargaining decreases, their political risk increases (Boddewyn, 2005) because they 
are less and less able to control the impact of government policy on their operations. This is especially 
pertinent in the post-socialist or emerging market context, where governments are more prone to 
introduce unexpected policy changes.  
In contrast, according to the Legitimacy Based Approach (LBA), the government constantly 
investigates the attributes and activities of foreign firms in the host country in order to check whether 
they are consistent with the government’s economic, political and social goals  (Henisz and Zelner, 
2005). Governments may be tempted to alter policies and introduce legislation to their political 
advantage and to the detriment of foreign firms (Stevens et al., 2016). More political constraints on 
the government’s ability to change existing policies can be associated with less political risk for firms 
(Stevens et al., 2016). In a stable and democratic environment, the larger amount of political checks 
and balances lead to greater constraints on government intervention over companies.  
Firms become legitimate if their activities are in line with the values of their host market 
environment. However International Business (IB) firms often encounter challenges in securing 
legitimacy as there are no international legislation or supranational organisations that would protect 
their rights –subsidiaries’ rights stem from national laws (Boddewyn et al., 1994).   
As a result, the legitimacy of foreign firms from the perspective of host governments, will 
depend on their contributions to national goals such as employment or technological investment 
(Stevens et al., 2016). When there is a congruence between the government’s goals and the activities 
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of the foreign business the legitimacy of the subsidiary increases in the eyes of the government 
(Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), however if they are not serving the government’s purposes they can 
easily become targets of hostile legislative changes (Sallai, 2013; Sallai and Schnyder, 2015). More 
authoritarian governments tend to be responsive to a smaller circle of elites than democratic 
governments that are accountable to a larger set of interest groups (Stevens et al., 2016). 
Consequently, a more authoritarian government has more leeway to intervene in those firms’ 
operations that lack legitimacy. However, as firms may not be aware of their lack of legitimacy or the 
method of intervention, new policies or change of legislation could cause them unanticipated shock to 
their operations and performance (Stevens et all, 2016) and a greater political risk for these non-
legitimate firms.  
Political interference in MNEs’ operations may also trigger a negative impact on  the 
government’s own goals, such as economic growth generated as a result of inward FDI (Luo, 2001). 
The perceived political risk by MNEs depends on whether their business objectives are consistent 
with the government’s long-term agendas (Stevens et al., 2015). Consequently companies whose 
activities are aligned with the government’s long-term goals may perceive a lower degree of political 
risk compared to those whose activities are not aligned (Henisz and Zelner, 2005).  
Subsidiaries can gain legitimacy by making government officials view their presence as 
necessary for the government’s objectives. Creating new workplaces, hiring local workers to reduce 
unemployment or investing in local infrastructure could be ways through which a subsidiary supports 
the government’s long-term goals. Governments evaluate the degree to which foreign subsidiaries’ 
presence and actions are legitimate or not based on these actions (Marquis and Qian, 2014) and the 
judgements about companies legitimacy could have serious consequences for subsidiary’s survival in 
the host country context (Bitektine, 2011). If a government views a firm or a certain group of firms as 
legitimate, it could signal its support by providing resources, favourable policies or tax incentives to 
those selected firms (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), whereas if it views a firm as non-legitimate it could 
introduce unexpected policy changes, new regulations or taxes that may create disruption in the firm’s 
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sector or industry. Based on the discussion above the following question arises: What kind of CPA 
strategies MNE subsidiaries engage in high risk host country contexts? In the next section we explore 
this question and look at how IB firms can manage FDI-related political risk with their CPA activities.  
2.2. Managing political risk with CPA 
International firms may choose to engage or not to engage in a bargaining relationship with 
the host government. Depending on managerial choice firms decide to comply with changes, avoid 
them or chose circumvention to offset the impact of government policy on their operations 
(Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). Compliance refers to the situation when firms comply with 
legislation, whereas avoidance and circumvention assume that these firms can operate independently 
of governmental constraints and incentives. To hedge against unfavourable government policies, firms 
might choose circumvention through illegal activities or other non-bargaining forms of political 
response (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994). If companies feel that the political risks are too high, they 
might decide to leave the host country and opt for an ‘exit’ strategy (Hirschman, 1970).  
The literature identifies conflictual and partnership type of bargaining behaviour. In a 
conflictual context both the government and firms try to appropriate rents or gains from each other. 
The resource-based view of conflictual bargaining argues that governments will try to make gains 
from firms, whereas firms will try to mitigate these governmental gains or try to make gains at the 
expense of governments (Stevens et al., 2016). In contrast, the partnership type of bargaining 
behaviour is a more positive view of business-government interactions. Partnership with governments 
is more likely to generate legitimacy than avoidance, circumvention, and conflictual bargaining, 
because partnering conveys a positive message and viewed almost like an approval of what 
international firms are doing (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994: 130). 
However most recent studies argue that CPA choices and political strategies should be 
divided into broader categories: the engaged and non-engaged approaches to CPA (De Villa et al., 
2018). Engaged approaches include CPA actions aimed at influencing the host country’s public policy 
by engaging with the host government (A. J. Hillman and Hitt, 1999), while the non-engaged 
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approaches to CPA aim to enable the MNE to avoid or conform to host country public policy by 
evading engagement with the host government (De Villa et al., 2018).  
The key difference between the two approaches is that while in the engaged approach MNEs 
try to share or modify the host country’s public policy context, in the non-engaged approach they 
comply the host country’s public policy environment but do not try to shape or modify it (De Villa et 
al., 2018). According to De Villa et al., there are four non-engaged political strategies through which 
MNEs adapt to the public policy context actively, rather than by passively conforming to high risk: 
low visibility, rapid compliance, reconfiguration and anticipation.  
Low visibility refers to a situation when MNEs minimize public visibility and risk exposure 
by not engaging with host governments in order to avoid being the target of discriminatory policies or 
expropriation. Rapid compliance describes a strategy when MNEs introduce high speed actions to 
obey rules, including actions like not engaging in corruption, paying just prices to suppliers or 
modifying the MNE’s organisational structure to comply with public policy. When firms rely on the 
reconfiguration strategy, they rearrange the MNE’s organisational structure for competitiveness, 
modify processes to sustain competitiveness, develop new ways to supply to restricted host markets or 
substituting imports in a host operation for local production to appear as a local value-adding MNE. 
The anticipation strategy is focused on the prediction of public policy in order to get the MNE a first-
mover advantage and ways to gain social support to enhance the MNE’s legitimacy. Actions in this 
strategy include monitoring the host country’s policy context, anticipating possibilities to comply with 
upcoming policy changes, and monitoring host and home government relations (De Villa et al., 2018). 
All these strategies are referred to as non-engaged strategies.  
However, some scholars found that firms in high political risk host country contexts will try 
to protect themselves from the adverse impact of political ties with government actors instead of 
exiting or non-engaging. The most relevant existing study about political risk in autocratic regimes is 
Dieleman and Boddewyn’s (2012) study about corporate strategies in Suharto’s Indonesia. They argue 
that firms may use their organisational structure to mitigate the potentially negative impact of political 
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risk in the host country. They conclude that a compartmentalized business-group structure constitutes 
an effective organisational response – or a ‘buffering strategy’ – to an autocratic political environment 
(Dieleman & Boddewyn 2012: 91).  
Yet even these studies do not tell us that besides restructuring, what other type of CPA 
strategies subsidiaries may engage in if they chose to stay in a high-risk country (John and Lawton, 
2018). We do not sufficiently understand how firms in emerging economies protect themselves from 
high political risks and what strategies they implement if they chose to engage rather than go for the 
non-engagement option. Previous studies have argued that when MNE senior managers perceive high 
host country political risk, they tend to choose a non-engaged approach to CPA by avoiding or 
actively adapting to the host country’s changing policy contexts (De Villa et al., 2018). Yet, it is not 
clear what subsidiaries do if they perceive high political risk and choose to take an engaged approach 
to CPA. To fill this gap, this study shows that high political risk may also encourage firms to engage 
in political activities and adapt to increasingly authoritarian regimes.   
2.3. FDI-led growth in Hungary’s dependent market economy 
Various authors have proposed characterisations and classifications of the type of capitalism 
that is emerging in post-socialist states. The so-called Visegrad countries (Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Hungary), had transformed their industrial structure – to a significant extent with the 
help of Western Multinational Companies (MNCs) (Orenstein 2013, Martin 2013, 2008,), therefore 
has been referred to as ‘dependent market economies’ (Noelke & Vliegenthart 2009). Indeed, FDI 
inflow into the Visegrad countries has accelerated around the time of their accession to the European 
Union in 2004, especially from Western European countries and contributed substantially to the 
economic restructuring of these post-socialist states. The predominantly German, Dutch and Austrian 
capital turned the region’s manufacturing into manufacturing miracles (Bohle and Greskovits 2012) 
between 2004 and 2008.  
However, during the financial crisis FDI inflows have become volatile and started to decline 
(Bohle, 2018). The problems caused by the financial crisis of 2008, deepened society’s 
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disillusionment and led to an aggressive political rhetoric against foreign capital in Hungary and to a 
lesser extend Poland. Expectations of FDI such as increased domestic competitiveness, substantial 
growth and economic convergence with the more developed Western European states of the EU did 
not materialise due to the ‘inability of domestic firms to become partners of local MNC subsidiaries, 
and finally the generally low inclination of MNCs to rely on local firms’ (Sass, 2017: 48).  
Although since the political turn in 1989, Hungary was a front-runner in attracting FDI, after 
the financial crisis it has dramatically left the Western reform path and increasingly turned against 
foreign businesses. Since the election of the national-conservative Fidesz government under Viktor 
Orbán in 2010, the previously most investment friendly country in the Visegrad four has turned into a 
high-risk political environment, at least for some foreign businesses. The three consecutive Orbán 
governments used their majority in parliament to impose high taxes on selected FDI dominated 
sectors (Sass and Kalotay, 2012: 1) and engaged in an intensive political rhetoric against multinational 
capital.  
The political speak has started to refer to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ FDI (Sass, 2017). ‘Bad’ FDI was 
increasingly viewed as aiming to replace domestic producers or service providers and repatriating 
profits – therefore not being beneficial for the country’s economy - whereas FDI that resulted in 
creating new jobs, contributing to the country’s exports and allow domestic companies to get engaged 
in global value chains as suppliers, became increasingly viewed by the Orbán government as ‘good’ 
FDI (Sass, 2017). This state-level change of attitude towards FDI had a direct impact on subsidiaries’ 
political legitimacy in Hungary, as well as the level of political risk they are experiencing in different 
sectors.  
Research shows that since 2010, the three consecutive Orbán Governments consistently 
supported export-oriented industries, such as car manufacturing, electronics production and shared 
service centres (Sass, 2017) and provided them with generous incentives. Incentives included smaller 
corporate tax rates, low labour costs, and other subsidies, in some cases worth up to 50 percent of 
investment (Byrne, 2016).  
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These export-oriented manufacturing sectors – that are considered to be ‘good’ FDI by the 
state - enjoy substantially smaller corporate taxes than their domestic counterparts. According to Sass 
(2017: 53), in 2015 the German carmaker, Audi, ‘did not pay any corporate tax’, whereas ‘Wizz Air, 
Suzuki, GE, Mercedes and Bosch paid 1-2 percent corporate tax only’. In 2017, the government 
lowered corporate tax rate to 9 percent – the lowest in the EU - benefitting large companies and 
incentivizing mostly midsized Hungarian and foreign-owned multinational companies with more than 
EUR 2m in revenue (Byrne, 2016) to use Hungary as a tax heaven.  
At the same time, the Orbán governments have taken a hostile stance toward ‘bad’ FDI (Sass, 
2017) by introducing special taxes and other regulatory measures, such as nationalisations and 
targeted sectoral regulations in service-related sectors. Foreign companies that serve the domestic 
market such as banking, energy, retail trade, telecommunications, and water supply were targeted with 
special, often discriminatory measures and legislative changes (Sass and Kalotay, 2012). According to 
the Financial Times, the contrast in the experience of foreign manufacturers compared with service-
oriented investors “points to Hungary’s drive to position itself as a low-cost manufacturing and 
logistics base in Germany’s economic hinterland” (Byrne, 2016: 1).  
Hence, although it has created an overall anti-foreign rhetoric in the last eight years, the 
Orbán government seems to be partial in its anti-FDI stance. It does not seek to fundamentally alter 
the country’s ‘export-led growth model’ that depends on FDI (Bohle, 2018) as it still strongly 
supports competition for new industrial investment (Bohle, 2018), even if only in export-related 
industries.  
The state’s drastically contrasting approach towards different sectors of the economy create a 
very interesting risk context in which IB firms behaviour can be investigated. According to earlier 
literature firms in targeted high risk industries would chose between three strategies: exit the 
Hungarian market, change their organisational structure or chose a non-engaged CPA strategy. This 
approach also assumes that at the same time those operating in more legitimate low-risk sectors would 
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chose the engaged approach to CPA and generally would be more active in their non-market strategies 
than those who operate in targeted high risk areas.  
Yet the puzzle arises. How can we explain that IB firms - even in the most hardly hit service-
related sectors - actively engage in CPA and only a small minority choses the non-engaged approach 
or the more drastic choice of exit or restructuring?  
Our study aims to explore these questions and investigate how MNE subsidiaries manage 
their CPA in a host country context, where political legitimacy of firms may change from one day to 
the next, depending on which sector they are operating in. Will firms that operate in so called ‘bad’ 
FDI industries manage a different CPA engagement strategy than those who operate in ‘good’ FDI 
sectors? Will those who operate in ‘bad’ FDI territory prefer to take a non-engaged approach to CPA 
and those operating in more legitimate sectors prefer to have an engaged approach to CPA? In the 
following sections we will answer these questions.  
3. DATA AND METHOD 
3.1. Context 
The study focused on Hungary as a high-risk political context in the years of 2010-18. The 
researchers carried out an interview-based qualitative research combined with research on the political 
context and individual companies using secondary data. Hungary was selected as a revelatory case, 
because it is arguably one of the most extreme cases of a shift away from an emerging relatively 
liberal democratic regime after the fall of communism, towards a more authoritarian type of state and 
most extreme increase of political risk (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984).  
Since the 2010 elections, - when Viktor Orbán’s conservative party Fidesz acquired a two-
thirds majority in the parliament – it has become increasingly clear that the “managerial” (Martin, 
2002) aspect of the Hungarian brand of capitalism has lost ground to the “political” one, showing thus 
signs of a reversal of the power relations between the political and the economic elite. Since 2010, 
Hungary’s “democracy score” has declined, bringing it closer to some of the less developed semi-
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consolidated democracies, like Romania and Bulgaria (Walker and Habdank–Kołaczkowska, 2012: 
6). This new phase of transition is often referred to as “institutional backsliding” (Sallai and Schnyder, 
2018).  While Hungary was a front-runner in attracting FDI during the 1990s, since 2010, the country 
has at times engaged in an aggressive political rhetoric against foreign capital and adopted 
unfavourable policies such as high taxes in MNE dominated industries (Sass and Kalotay, 2012: 1). 
Hungary’s rapid backsliding into a relational- state-dominated system, makes the country a critical 
case and hence particularly suitable to investigate the impact of institutional change on firm CPA 
strategies, because patterns become more visible than in less turbulent times (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
3.2. Sample 
The data presented come from multiple rounds of data collection and a variety of sources, in-
depth interviews with business leaders, and experts from the context of the case, as well as 
documentary analysis of news reports over seven years. Data collection and data analysis was carried 
out in parallel, which allowed the development of theoretical insights and propositions, while testing 
and modifying these as the project evolved. Overlaps in data collection and analysis are beneficial, 
since it speeds up the analysis and “reveals helpful adjustments to data collection” (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
p. 535).  
The empirical study comprised 56 semi-structured interviews. The interviews increased in 
focus and depth over the period due to the iterative and cumulative nature of the fieldwork process. 
To obtain multiple perspectives on the impacts of the new government on firms, the study sought a 
range of opinions as recommended for this type of research (Perry, 1998: 798). The sample included 
43 business people, working at MNE subsidiaries from developed countries and local firms, and a 
further 13 experts from the context of the cases. By comparing and contrasting views from different 
actors, possible bias was decreased, and we interpreted the data in a more nuanced manner. In-depth 
interviews are an insightful method for exploring the “often nuanced causal factors of specific 
managerial action” (Lawton et al., 2013b, p. 231). Given the very sensitive nature of the topic of study 
and the political climate in Hungary, the sampling method necessarily was limited by companies’ 
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willingness to participate despite the possibility of political repercussions. While a self-selection bias 
cannot be completely excluded, given that an inductive, theory-building approach is used, the results 
are not affected by this shortcoming. Indeed, the sectoral composition of the sample is diverse: The 
single largest industry in our sample was banking and construction with six companies, followed by 
the manufacturing, energy, ICT and retail industries. Overall, the sample contains firms from eleven 
different industries. The interviewed subsidiaries originated from the US (6), France (4), Germany (3), 
UK (1), Switzerland (1), Denmark (1), Italy (1), and the Netherlands (1).  
Interviewees comprised CEOs and Directors at MNE subsidiaries and at domestic Hungarian 
firms. We interviewed 23 respondents working at subsidiaries of MNEs in Hungary and a further 20 
respondents from domestic firms. Due to the longitudinal nature of the study, we have interviewed in 
some cases the same respondents both in the early years of the Orbán regime in 2011-2013 as well as 
recently in 2015-17. Interviews were conducted in English and in Hungarian. Interviews in Hungarian 
were translated by one of the authors. Each interview lasted for about 60-90 minutes. Respondents 
were provided total confidentiality; all their data was coded and anonymized. Table 1 details the 
interviews, news articles and reports from which the qualitative data was drawn for this study. 
Table 1: HERE  
In order to reduce bias, we used secondary sources to increase our confidence about the 
reliability of the interview responses.  
Table 2: HERE 
We analysed over 70 pieces of printed and online newspaper articles and reports found on 
corporate websites, journalistic sources and publications by reputable NGOs such as Transparency 
International. Due to the lack of scholarly research on these topics in Hungary, such sources are often 
the only information available and are more reliable than official government sources.  
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4. FINDINGS 
4.1. The Company Level: Subsidiaries’ CPA strategies 
Based on the empirical analysis we identified five different CPA strategies that subsidiaries use in 
Hungary’s high-risk context. See Table 3.  
TABLE 3: HERE 
Four out of the five depend on the type of engagement with the host government and the level of 
adaptation to the host country’s public policy, whereas the fifth, the exit (Hirschman, 1970) strategy is 
outside of this framework, as in this category firms chose to either leave the host country or sell part or 
the whole of their subsidiary to the government. Figure 1 illustrates the CPA strategies used by MNE 
subsidiaries in a high-risk host country context.  
FIGURE 1: HERE 
In the context of high political risk, it is difficult for companies to develop coping or buffering 
strategies like the ones that Dieleman and Boddewyn (2012) describe, because in contrast to Suharto’s 
Indonesia, the Hungarian public policy context is uncertain. However, instead of relying only on non-
engaged CPA approaches by exercising ‘no exit’ and ‘no voice’ (De Villa et al., 2018:7) strategy as 
earlier studies suggested, findings of this study show that subsidiaries use a variety of different 
engaged and non-engaged methods to sustain their competitiveness in the host market. Instead of just 
staying within the high-risk host country context, without exerting influence over the host country’s 
public policy – impacted by their host country legitimacy, size, compliance towards their MNE’s 
regulatory framework and the nature of their activities (export vs. domestic) - firms engage in 
different CPA activities (see Table 4).  
TABLE 4: HERE 
Interviews suggest that the Orbán government’s attack on ‘bad FDI’ and the consequent 
change in firms’ legitimacy had an impact on firms’ strategies and investment decisions - however, 
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not necessarily as the researchers have expected. Literature suggest that when firms perceive high host 
country political risk – arising from host country political institutions and from the distance between 
home and host country political institutions – they will prefer a non-engaged approach to CPA (Villa 
et al., 2018). In contrast, our study shows, that most subsidiaries try to adapt to governmental 
pressures and decide to cooperate with the regime by engaging actively in public policy. The ‘active 
responsiveness strategy’ refers to the situation when firms respond to the host country’s pressures by 
adapting to the government’s public policy and engaging with the government hoping for better 
policy outcomes. Some of the political actions used within this approach belong to well-known 
information strategies identified by Hilmann and Hitt (1999) such as lobbying or writing policy 
papers. However, in the high-risk host country context subsidiaries are often required to extend these 
well-known, traditional CPA methods with other practices that open the doors directly to government-
level decision-makers as well as which substantiate their ‘loyalty’ towards the government’s strategic 
objectives or more generally the governing elite.  
Besides, signing a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’ with the government, which outlines the 
main framework of collaboration between the subsidiary and the government, firms also engage in 
several other types of CPA techniques, such as: joint public-private projects with the government, 
often with EU funding; investment projects with state support; the use of external PA consultancies 
that are often related to the government to get access to high level government officials; direct 
engagement with high-level decision-makers (often the prime minister) through the subsidiary’s CEO 
or even the CEO of the regional headquarter or the main headquarter; as well as finding direct 
engagement through the parent company’s embassy; or using suppliers that are ‘recommended’ by the 
government in their supply chains.  
Although some of these actions are initiated by the subsidiaries, other are prompted by the 
state. Respondents, especially in less legitimate sectors that were more affected by state intervention 
expressed that fear and uncertainty often lead to servility and cooperation.  
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“Yes, and I feel that in order to represent my company’s interests I must be servile, but on the 
other hand this impacts my private life. I do not go to the street to protest that much 
anymore…I am more allowing.” (Subsidiary7, 16.08.2016). 
Many firms in Hungary choose not to ‘argue’ with the state, but rather try and please the government, 
so that they can get concessions or preferential treatment in return. They feel threatened by the state 
and fear retaliatory measures if they are not politically subservient.  
The active responsiveness approach may also involve participation doing business through 
government-related oligarchs and their firms. Although subsidiaries rarely engage in corruption-
related activities (and corruption was not part of the scope of this study), they might use government-
related or government referred suppliers to show their loyalty and strengthen their legitimacy towards 
the host country’s government.  
Although many firms both from the most and the least legitimate sectors engage in active 
responsiveness, some firms chose to refuse to openly cooperate with the government. We labelled this 
type of CPA strategy the ‘passive responsiveness strategy’, which has similarities with what De Villa 
et al., 2018 identified as ‘low visibility’ approach. Firms in this category avoid directly influencing 
the government and adopt a low public profile (De Villa et al., 2018). However, in contrast to the ‘low 
visibility’ approach, the ‘passive responsiveness’ strategy is an engaged strategy as companies attempt 
to influence public policy, however they choose collective representation channels - such as silent 
engagement through sectoral associations, and/or chambers of commerce, the avoidance of using the 
press and the avoidance of ‘going alone’, direct lobbying strategies. Companies in this category try to 
avoid direct cooperation or confrontation with the government by taking the ‘wait and see’ approach 
and trying to seek representation for their interests at interest groups. They put all investment 
decisions on hold, or channel investments to other countries in the region and keep costs at a 
minimum.  
“There is no longer-term economic strategy. It is always changing, and we cannot plan. We 
feel that, because of the short-sightedness of politics, the government misses big 
opportunities, for example investments.” (Respondent at Subsidiary11, interviewed on 
06.09.2011.) 
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 As Hungary is an EU member state, subsidiaries could in principle turn to the EU’s 
institutions to seek protection from the increasingly autocratic government’s interventions. However, 
our interviews show that that is not the case. Subsidiaries that are members in industrial associations 
refrain from trying to use the EU level to alter the host country’s institutional environment through 
lobbying the EU’s authorities, because of corporate leaders’ direct exposure to the autocratic state. Or 
with other words, subsidiaries tend to avoid confrontation with the host government through Brussels 
as this might have a negative impact on their legitimacy as viewed by the host government.  
A respondent at a multinational’s subsidiary - who is also a member at a host country 
association explained that they actively engage in a European umbrella organization in Brussels, 
however they intentionally do not formulate messages at EU level for fear of domestic repercussions: 
“Truthfully, we do not let our voice be heard [in Brussels]. Whatever the leader of the Polish 
association says is good - they have a consolidated situation at home, and he can talk. We say 
nothing. …It can cause troubles at home“(Respondent at Subsidiary8, interviewed on 
16.04.2012.) 
Hence, rather than voicing concerns in international arenas like the EU institutions, companies 
attempt to remain invisible to the government. Therefore, the strategy of this second group of 
companies consists in surviving the autocratic regime in a state of ‘dormancy’ to use a biological 
analogy. 
This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The more discontinuous risk firms face the more likely they will choose an engaged 
CPA strategy in the form of active or passive responsiveness.  
In contrast to the passive responsiveness strategy, the ‘non-responsiveness strategy’ is chosen 
by firms that do not want to engage with public policy in any way but neither do adapt to the policy 
changes. The non-responsive strategy characterised the behaviour of those companies that were non-
responsive for a few years and then decided to implement the exit strategy. Hence the non-responsive 
strategy could be defined as the first step towards ‘exit’. Within the sample, we identified three 
subsidiaries that were following the non-responsive strategy until they exited and in all three cases the 
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government has changed the structure and conditions of the industries that the subsidiaries were 
operating in so drastically that these firms chose not to adapt to the requirements, as adapting would 
have meant that they have to operate long-term losses. In all three cases the decision of exit took 
years.  
Despite the few ‘exit’ cases - although in the early years of the Orbán regime many 
multinationals have consider pulling out of the Hungarian market in the first few years (2010-2013) - 
most of the interviewed companies decided to stay as they did not want to lose their established 
market shares. The ‘capital flight’ strategy described by some researchers (e.g. Markus 2012) does 
hence not seem to be widely used by companies in Hungary under the Orbán regime. Instead, rather 
than expanding and innovating, some firms chose to operate quietly with minimal investment, 
minimal engagement with the host government and minimal adaptation to the local conditions. 
The fourth category is ‘restructuring’, which resonates with De Villa et al.’s 
‘reconfiguration’ strategy (2018) or Dieleman and Boddewyn’s ‘buffering’ strategy (2012) according 
to which firms initiate second-order changes within their organisational structure and processes in 
order to maintain competitiveness (De Villa et al., 2018) or to circumvent the regime’s influence 
(Dieleman and Doddewyn, 2012). However, in contrast to the reconfiguration and buffering 
approaches, the ‘restructuring’ strategy may be defined as an ‘engaged’ CPA approach, which helps 
firms in less legitimate industries or industries under severe government intervention to modify, split 
up or rearrange the ownership of their subsidiary in order to ‘save’ the other parts of the firm.  
This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The lower a firm’s legitimacy in the eyes of the government, the more likely 
they will engage in a non-engaged strategy or restructuring.  
Companies that follow this approach divide their operations into different business units, 
creating smaller sub-subsidiaries in fields where government appropriation is considered to have a 
higher chance. Restructuring could involve the rearrangement of ownership, organisational structure 
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or the restructuring of business units according to different types of activities. In the sample one 
subsidiary had concrete contingency plans for ‘restructuring’. The firm’s respondent claimed that the 
subsidiary is in constant tension due to the fears of government nationalisation plans within the 
industry, but due to their large investment in Hungary they ruled the ‘exit’ option out.  The company 
introduced a restructuring plan that would be implemented in case the government initiates 
nationalisation.  
“That kind of structure could be something that could make it easier for us to adapt if the 
environment became really nasty. We have not decided to do that, it is one of the things we 
look at from time to time. We are not sure if this is one of the cures for the disease, but it is a 
factor that we take into consideration. You cannot really prepare for nationalisation. We are 
sure it is not going to be Venezuela or Argentina, but there are all kinds of ways to do that 
under the carpet.”  
Those firms that decided not to engage nor to adapt may ‘exit’ Hungary. This last strategy draws on 
Hirschman’s (1970) exit strategy, implying that the MNE leaves or does not even enter the host 
country (Meyer et al., 2009). This type of non-engaged approach to CPA assumes that the MNE 
avoids operations in the host country and the firm exits as the senior management is unable or 
unwilling to invest in efforts to influence the host country’s public policy (De Villa et al., 2018). 
However, we found that MNEs do not simply exit, but even within the exit option they may have a 
choice in a high-risk autocratic context. They either exit by leaving the country (Hirschman, 1970) 
and moving their operations into another country, or they exit by selling their subsidiary to the 
government. The current study found examples in both categories. Some companies decided to leave 
the country simply by pulling their operations out of Hungary, while others decided to make a profit 
on leaving by selling their operations to the government. Therefore, we define leaving the host 
country by closing subsidiary’s operations ‘Non-engaged exit’, while selling off part of the business 
or the whole business to the government as ‘Engaged exit’. Within the sample we found one company 
that left with non-engaged exit and two companies that left Hungary with engaged exit.  
This leads to the following proposition: 
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Proposition 3: When an MNE decides to exit a host market, the higher the level of the host 
country’s intervention in the firm’s sector, the more likely the MNE will be to choose an 
engaged exit. 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
In this paper we explored how MNEs of foreign subsidiaries manage their political strategies 
in high-risk institutional contexts. We noted the discrepancy of our findings from the Hungarian 
context with recent studies on non-engagement in high-risk political contexts. Our empirical findings 
show that MNE subsidiaries use a wide range of non-engaged and engaged strategies to handle the 
increasingly politically risky environment. This extends previous studies that find that subsidiaries 
choose non-engagement strategies (de Villa et al., 2018) in high-risk context.  We explain our 
findings by arguing that firms may chose different CPA engagement strategies in constantly high-risk 
environments and in environments where risk drastically increases after market entry. We 
investigated firms that have been operating in the Hungarian market for many years before their 
political environment has changed. We found that in the increased, discontinuous risk context, firms 
opt for both non-engaged, and engaged strategies in their political activities.  
Our findings show the importance of the legitimacy perspective to FDI (Stevens et al., 2016) 
to understand these strategies in rapidly changing political environments. Firms appear to choose 
strategies that maximise their legitimacy based on their assessment of the government’s goals. 
Legitimacy is hence a key driver explaining different strategic choices. Our study also suggest that the 
legitimacy perspective can be enhanced by considering the nature of risk that firms face. In contexts 
of continuous risk, firms may rely more on non-engaged strategies (De Villa et al., 2018), whereas in 
host countries, where risk could be defined as discontinuous subsidiaries engage in a combination of 
engaged and non-engaged political strategies.  
Practitioner implications 
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The practitioner implications of our study are that even in a very hostile environment like 
Orbán’s Hungary, many companies still seem to prefer to keep a presence in a temporarily 
unattractive environment, hoping for long-term pay-offs on their presence.  
Limitations 
The limitations of our study have to do with the case-study nature of the research and the 
possible self-selection bias in the sample. Indeed, given the sensitivity of the topic, we cannot exclude 
that a certain level of self-selection bias may have been introduced. The variety of companies we 
interviewed and the variety of answers that we obtained, however, indicated that this is not a major 
issue. Future studies should attempt to compare our findings to other cases of ‘clan states’ as well as 
extending the sample to a larger number of firms. Future research also should investigate whether the 
CPA strategies adopted in a context of high arbitrariness and uncertainty still lead to positive 
performance outcomes and are hence viable in the long-term. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1: SOURCES USED 
Period of interview Number of interviews  
2015-2017 24 
2011-2013 32 
Total number of interviews 56 
Total number of printed and online news articles and reports 71 
 
TABLE 2: INFORMANTS BY SECTOR AND TYPE 
Informant's sector 
Type of interviewee (number of 
interviews) 
Year of interviews (number of 
interviews in that year) 
Number of Total 
interviews in the 
sector 
Banking CEO (4), Vice-CEO (2) 2012 (4), 2016 (2) 6 
Construction Chair (2), Director (2), CEO (1) 2011 (3), 2012 (1), 2016 (1) 5 
Energy CEO(1), Director (5) 2011 (4), 2013 (1), 2015 (1) 6 
ICT CEO (4), Director (3) 
2011 (3), 2012 (1), 2016 (1),  
2017 (2) 7 
Manufacturing 
CEO (5), Vice-CEO (1), Director 
(1) 
2011 (2), 2012 (1), 2015 (1), 
2016 (2), 2017 (1) 7 
Telecommunication CEO (1), Vice-CEO (1) 2015 (1), 2016 (1) 2 
Retail Director (4) 2011 (1), 2012 (1), 2016 (2) 4 
Wholesale CEO (2) 2012 (1), 2017 (1) 2 
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All other sectors: 
tobacco, tourism, 
consulting, 
advertising, 
beverages CEO (1), Director (3) 
2012 (1), 2013 (1), 2016 (1), 
2017 (1) 4 
Other 
Secretary General (4), Director 
(7), Journalist (1), Political advisor 
(1) 
2011 (4), 2012 (2), 2016 (2), 
2017 (3), 2011 ( 1), 2017 (1) 13 
Total number of 
interviews 
Respondents at MNE subsidiaries 
(22), Domestic firms (21), NGOs 
and other (13) 
2011 (18), 2012 (12), 2013 (2), 
2015 (3), 2016 (12), 2017 (9) 56 
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TABLE 3: Taxonomy of the political strategies that MNE subsidiaries use to stay in high political risk 
host markets 
 Active 
Responsiveness 
Strategy 
Passive 
Responsiveness 
(Dormancy) 
Non-
responsiveness 
Restructuring Exit 
Definition An ‘engaged’ 
approach to CPA:  
Active adaptation 
to the 
government’s 
public policy and 
engaging with the 
government 
hoping for better 
policy outcomes 
An ‘engaged’ 
approach to 
CPA: 
Engaged 
strategy by 
attempting to 
influence public 
policy, through 
collective 
representation 
channels 
Non-engaged 
approach to CPA:  
No engagement 
with public policy 
in any way and no 
adaptation either 
An ‘engaged’ 
approach to CPA: 
 
Rearrangement of:  
• ownership, 
• organisational 
structure o 
• the 
restructuring 
of business 
units 
according to 
different 
types of 
activities 
in order to ‘save’ 
the other parts of 
the firm 
Leaving the 
country by 
Engaged exit: 
selling the 
whole or part of 
the company to 
the state or 
people close to 
the governing 
elite 
Non-engaged 
exit: leaving the 
country 
Actions • Strategic 
Partnership 
Agreement 
with 
Government, 
• Lobbying 
• Writing 
policy papers 
• Contracting 
government-
friendly 
consulting 
firms 
• Contracting 
government 
recommended 
suppliers  
• Avoidance 
of using the 
press  
• Avoidance 
of ‘going 
alone’ 
• Avoidance 
of direct 
lobbying 
strategies 
• Investment 
decisions 
on hold 
• No 
compliance 
with host 
country’s 
public policy 
• No 
engagement 
in public 
policy or 
interest 
representation 
through 
interest 
groups 
• Wait and see 
approach 
• Investment 
decisions on 
hold 
• Split up or  
rearrange the 
ownership,  
• Rearrange 
org. structure 
• Restructure 
business units  
• Selling 
part or the 
whole of 
the 
company 
• Pulling out 
of the 
country 
without 
selling 
operations 
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TABLE 4: CPA STRATEGIES AND ACTIONS IN HIGH RISK CONTEXT 
CPA Strategy Definition Quote Examples Actions Company 
examples 
Active 
responsiveness 
Engage with 
the host 
government 
and adapt to 
its public 
policy 
“There is a regular, very high-level 
relationship between us and the 
government, where behind closed 
doors we get very reassuring 
signals”. (Subsidiary7) 
“As we are so exposed to the state it 
is expected that the top managers 
represent us towards government 
decision-makers.” (Subsidiary2)  
“Go there [government] personally, 
get some support from the embassy, 
go there [government] as part of the 
chamber, we also have our opinions 
that we publish, and we should speak 
to each other and think 
constructively. “ (Subsidiary2) 
Strategic partnership 
agreement with 
government, 
Joint public-private 
projects 
Investment with state 
support 
Use of external PA 
consultancy  
Direct engagement 
through PA 
director/subsidiary CEO 
Direct engagement 
through MNE parent CEO 
Engagement through 
embassy 
Subsidiary 1, 2, 
4, 6, 7,  10, 12, 
15, 16, 17, 18 
Passive 
responsiveness 
Adapt to the 
host country’s 
public policy 
but do not 
engage with 
the 
government 
directly 
“Truthfully, we do not let our voice 
be heard. Whatever the leader of the 
Polish association says is good - they 
have a consolidated situation at 
home, and he can talk. We say 
nothing.” (Subsidiary8) 
Silent engagement only 
through sectoral 
association and/or 
chamber or commerce 
 
Compliance with public 
policy 
 
Avoidance of press or any 
other voice strategy 
Subsidiary 3, 5, 
8 
Non-
responsiveness 
(can be first phase 
of exit) 
Do not engage 
with 
government, 
do not adapt to 
public policy 
‘There is no longer-term economic 
strategy. It is always changing, and 
we cannot plan. We feel that, 
because of the short-sightedness of 
politics, the government misses big 
opportunities, for example 
investments.” (Subsidiary11)  
 
Most companies had to get used to 
the new reality and you try to stay 
out of trouble, out of the way, try to 
keep your head low. In a word that is 
really what you are trying to do.  
Which for a size of company like us 
it is extremely tough (Subsidiary1). 
 
No engagement with 
public policy in any form 
 
No adaptation to public 
policy 
Subsidiary 11 
Restructuring Modify or 
plan to modify 
organisational 
structure to 
avoid 
appropriation 
“There is a strategic trend in my 
industry actually to separate [the 
two] sides of the business […] to 
actually split it into two separate 
companies. And there is talk that if 
you do that then […] part of the 
business could be shared, you can 
have the government taking a share 
in that.  
This is called functional separation 
[…], utility companies have done 
this for a while. That kind of 
structure could be something that 
could make it easier for us to adapt 
if the environment became really 
nasty” (Subsidiary1). 
Restructuring ownership 
 
Restructuring 
organisational structure  
 
Restructuring business 
units according to 
activities in order to avoid 
expropriation 
 
 
Subsidiary 1 
Exit (Hirschman, 
1970) 
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Engaged Exit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-engaged Exit 
 
 
Selling off to 
the state and 
becoming a 
state-owned 
enterprise 
 
Closing 
operations and 
leaving the 
country 
 
  
Selling off part of the 
business or the whole 
business 
 
 
 
Leaving the host country 
by closing subsidiary’s 
operations 
 
 
Subsidiary 11, 
13, 9 
 
 
 
 
Subsidiary 9 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: CPA strategies used by MNE subsidiaries in a high-risk context 
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